OoP Notes

NOTE: These are expository comments on a philosophical text as opposed to a definition or conceptual analysis.

Outlines of Pyrrhonism by Sextus Empiricus
'''Trans. Johnathan Barnes'''

LEGEND: {Chapter} | [Section] | (Translator Note) | » Pug Comment

{i} The most fundamental difference among philosophies

[1] When people are investigating any subject, the likely result is either a discovery or a denial of a discovery and a confession of inapprehensibility, or else a continuation of the investigation. [2] This, no doubt, is why in the case of philosophical investigations, too, some have said they have discovered truth, some have asserted it cannot be apprehended and others are still investigating.

[3] Those who are called Dogmatists in the proper sense of the word think that they have discovered the truth - for example, the schools of Aristotle and Epicurus and the Stoics, and some others. The schools of Clitomachus and Carneades, and other Academics, have asserted that things cannot be apprehended.(1) And the Skeptics are still investigating. [4] Hence the most fundamental kinds of philosophy are reasonably thought to be three: the Dogmatic, The Academic, and the Skeptical. The former two it will be appropriate for others to describe: in the present work we shall discuss in outline(2) the Skeptical persuasion. By way of preface let us say that on none of the matters to be discussed do we affirm that things certainly are just as we say they are: rather, we report(3) descriptively on each item according to how it appears to us at the time.(4)

(1) The same is said of the Cyrenaics at I 215 For the New Academy see I 220-31; and note that other sources expressly say that the Academics did not 'assert that things cannot be apprehended'.

(2) ὑποτυπωτικῶς: the work is an outline or ὑποτύπωσις, and Sextus frequently reminds us of the fact: I 206, 222; II 1, 79, 185, 194; III 1, 114, 167, 279. Note also his assurances that he is only offering 'few out of many' examples (I 58, note) and that he is concerned to be brief (I 163, note); and see I 94; II 84, 212; III 56, 71, 135, 168.

(3) For this use of the term 'report' see I 15, 197, 203.

(4) Cf. e.g. I 191; II 187.

» The "fundamental differences among philosophies" with respect to investigation, discovery, apprehension and truth at least. It isn't clear this is meant to have a scope with more breadth than these interests.

» It seems uncontroversial to argue the intention of investigation is to figure something out which one either accomplishes, gives up on or continues investigating. Supposing that philosophical investigation has anything to do with truth, however, seems like it would have to be mostly a matter of epistemic philosophy as opposed to philosophy in general.